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Executive Summary 
Increasing energy efficiency is a cornerstone in the effort to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions and lower America’s dependence on oil supplied by parties under the 
control of foreign governments.  It has been estimated that no more than 60% of the 
economically justifiable energy efficiency potential is being achieved in California at this 
time.   With time running out on the opportunity to avoid the potentially catastrophic 
societal and economic consequences of our current level of reliance on hydrocarbon 
fuels, the challenge we face is to capture that remaining 40% and more of energy 
efficiency potential as soon as possible.   
Much of the remaining economically justifiable energy efficiency potential lies in 
changing the behavior of energy users – in particular, changing the decisions that they 
make about adopting energy-efficient technologies and practices, and in changing the 
ways in which they use energy (e.g., lifestyle changes).  A review of the literature in 
psychology, sociology, social psychology and behavioral economics suggests that some 
behavioral science-based approaches to improving the acceptance of energy-efficient 
products in the market show great promise.  However, this promise has yet to be realized 
because practical field experiments are required to discover what works and what does 
not work and why, and these experiments have not been conducted.  
To improve the effectiveness of energy efficiency programs by increasing the likelihood 
that consumers adopt energy efficient technologies and practices, a formal research and 
development (R&D) effort designed to find effective strategies for improving energy 
efficiency program performance must be undertaken.  This effort should focus on 
discovering effective behavioral science-based strategies for improving the performance 
of existing programs and on developing new and more effective approaches to offering 
these programs.  Currently, California government and regulators sponsor substantial 
R&D designed to accelerate the rate at which more energy-efficient technology is 
available in the market.  At the same time, almost no R&D is expended that is intended to 
improve the likelihood that customers adopt these technologies once they are 
commercially available.  This is a significant gap in program development.   
There are well-established procedures for managing and carrying out product and service 
R&D efforts.  They are generally discussed in the academic literature under the heading 
of the Management of Innovation.  Innovation is managed by moving new product and 
service design ideas through a stepwise process from idea generation at the very 
beginning, to full-scale integration with business operations at the end.  Along the way, a 
number of appropriately scaled experiments are carried out to solve the myriad technical 
problems that surround the development of something new.  Most major corporations 
rely on innovation to survive and to maintain their market position.  This paper argues 
that the establishment of a process designed to manage innovation must be developed in 
California to foster the creation of badly needed program improvements and develop new 
and more effective energy efficiency delivery programs. 
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Experimentation is a critical requirement in the process of innovation.  It is the 
mechanism that innovators use to identify what works and what does not work during the 
process of product development and marketing.  Historically, there is very little evidence 
of the use of experimentation to test alternative energy efficiency program design features 
offered by utilities in California or elsewhere.  Instead, programs tend to emerge 
full-blown from concept testing to implementation – without significant prototype 
development and testing.   
Pilot studies and demonstration projects have limited usefulness in product and program 
development – particularly when they are undertaken before the program has undergone 
prototype testing.  Because pilots are generally large-scale program demonstrations and 
do not vary design alternatives, they don’t produce useful information for improving 
program performance.  It takes months or even years to complete a pilot in the current 
energy efficiency program environment and, in the end, very little can be learned.  This 
paper argues that instead of pilot testing, realistic small-scale experimental versions of 
key program components (i.e., messages, delivery channels, social network effects, etc.) 
should be completed prior to any full-scale pilot testing.   
In part, the rush to market of energy efficiency programs is driven by the perceived 
urgent need to implement energy efficiency programs.  Probably more important are 
significant institutional barriers (inside utilities and in the regulatory relationship) that 
discourage experimentation.  This paper argues that the need to develop effective 
programs outweighs the need to act quickly and that institutional barriers are 
surmountable.   
To stimulate interest and thought about how experimentation can be used to improve 
program performance, this paper describes a number of experimental techniques that can 
be applied to the study of the impacts of behavioral factors on consumer 
decision-making.  It provides examples of important research questions that can be 
answered using experimental techniques.  It is designed to provide a good working 
introduction to the use of experimental techniques in program development.  It begins 
with an introduction to the Classical experimental designs (i.e., the Completely 
Randomized Design, the Randomized Blocks Design, the Factorial Design, and the 
Covariance Design).  These designs are useful for illustrating the value of 
experimentation and the logic that underlies it.  However, sometimes, these designs will 
be inappropriate or impossible to achieve in the context of the policy debate or 
organization in which the experiment is to be carried out.  Therefore, in addition to the 
Classical experimental designs, the paper discusses several useful Quasi-Experimental 
designs (i.e., the Non-Equivalent Control Group Design, the Interrupted Time Series 
Design, and the Regression Discontinuity Design).   
There is a pressing need to develop more effective methods for increasing the likelihood 
that consumers will adopt more energy-efficient technologies and behaviors.  There are 
reasonable hypotheses from the behavioral sciences about how improvements can be 
achieved.  The methodological tools are available for moving these hypotheses from the 
theory stage to the stage of practical application through formal organizational processes 
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and scientific methods that will ensure efficient use of resources and probable success.  
What is holding us back? 
This paper discusses several key institutional problems that must be overcome to achieve 
significant progress, such as:  
1. The need for improvement in the effectiveness of energy efficiency programs 
through the development of more effective behavioral interventions has to be 
recognized by the policy community (i.e., the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC), the California Energy Commission (CEC), and the 
program design community in the utility and consulting sectors). 
2. A thoughtful decision has to be made by regulators concerning the proper locus 
of responsibility for overseeing the necessary R&D efforts (i.e., the utilities, the 
University of California, a state government agency, a national energy research 
lab, or some combination of the above) aimed at improving the performance of 
energy efficiency programs through effective behavioral interventions.   
3. Funding for R&D designed to improve the design of energy efficiency programs 
must be made available by regulators to the party(s) that oversee development of 
improved energy efficiency programs with the understanding that these program 
development costs are a necessary cost of managing and operating these 
programs. 
4. Failures in the R&D process must be recognized as a natural part of progress in 
R&D efforts. 
5. To the extent that utilities are assigned responsibility for such R&D, they will 
need to develop the manpower, management capability and business strategies 
that incorporate routine R&D related to improving program effectiveness into 
their energy efficiency program operations. 
6. Regulators will have to develop the manpower, management capability and 
business strategies that will allow them to provide meaningful oversight of the 
R&D process without hindering progress.   
The above institutional problems should not be taken lightly.  To solve them, it will be 
necessary to completely revisit the way that energy efficiency programs are developed 
and supported.  It will require major modifications to the practices that are used to 
manage these programs both inside and outside utilities. 
Any significant R&D effort will require significant economic investment, above and 
beyond the cost of delivering energy efficiency programs today. At the moment, an act 
of faith is required to accept the notion that significant expenditures on program 
development based on behavioral science theories will dramatically improve energy 
efficiency.  The effectiveness of behavioral strategies for improving the likelihood that 
consumers adopt energy-efficient technologies and practices simply remains to be 
demonstrated.   This does not mean there aren’t excellent reasons for believing that these 
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strategies will dramatically change the landscape of energy efficiency programs.  
Consider this fact:  In 1965, the prevalence of cigarette smoking in the US was about 
51% of the adult population.  In 2007, the prevalence of cigarette smoking in the US was 
about 23% of the adult population.  This is a 50% reduction in prevalence (of a behavior 
that is probably much more difficult to attenuate than decisions about energy-related 
behavior) over a 42 year period – or a reduction of about 1.2% per year.  Behavioral 
interventions figured prominently in the achievement of this reduction.  It seems likely 
that such interventions will prove to be even more effective in changing energy use 
behavior. 
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1.  Introduction  
Increasing the efficiency of energy use is a cornerstone in the effort to reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions and lower America’s dependence on oil supplied by parties under 
the control of foreign governments.  While energy efficiency programs have been 
evolving since 1973 in the US, and a lot of progress has been made, it has been estimated 
that less than 60% of the economically justifiable energy efficiency potential is being 
achieved (Rufo and Coito 2002).  Moreover, potential studies typically focus entirely on 
the potential from improving the efficiency of energy use in buildings and production 
processes.  These studies completely ignore energy use arising from decisions made by 
businesses and households about the contents of their supply-chains and energy 
efficiency improvements that can come from changing lifestyles.  In other words, the 
untapped potential of energy efficiency is probably very large.  With time running out on 
the opportunity to avoid the likely catastrophic societal and economic consequences of 
our current reliance on hydrocarbon fuels, the challenge that we face is to capture that 
potential as quickly as possible.   
Much of the remaining economically justifiable energy efficiency potential lies in 
changing the behavior of energy users (Lutzenhiser 1993; Lutzenhiser et. al., 2002, 2003; 
(Golov and Eto 1996; Nadel and Geller 1996; Sanstad and Howarth 1994; and Sullivan 
2009).  Unfortunately, while achieving significant improvements in energy efficiency 
may depend to a very large extent on our ability to influence important decisions made by 
consumers, our knowledge of how to impact consumer behaviors related to energy 
efficiency remains very limited.   
Our inability to impact important consumer behaviors stems not from a lack of interesting 
theories about how to alter consumer behavior, but from a lack of practical experience in 
applying these theories to changing consumer choice behavior related to energy 
efficiency.  The behavioral science literature contains a number of powerful theoretical 
perspectives that suggest how changes in consumer behavior related to energy efficiency 
can be achieved.  Unfortunately, because there has been little experimentation with the 
application of these theories to modifying consumer choice behavior related to energy 
efficiency, we don’t know what will work and what will not work. 
To name just a few interesting observations about behavior related to energy efficiency 
decisions, behavioral scientists tell us: 
1. Decisions are shaped by many considerations beyond perceived costs and 
material benefits, and appeals to motivations other than self-interest can be 
successful in changing behavior (Biggart and Lutzenhiser 2007).  Therefore, it 
should be possible to develop alternative messages to consumers designed to 
appeal to core values, opinions and attitudes that may be much more likely to 
trigger desired choice behavior than information concerning costs and benefits. 
2. Decision-making heuristics other than economic rationality often guide consumer 
and business decision-making (Sullivan 2009).  Examples of such alternative 
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decision-making heuristics include altruism, bounded rationality, conformity and 
elimination by aspects.1 
3. Feedback to consumers on the consequences of their actions can enhance the 
likelihood that they engage in energy-efficient behavior (Wenett et al. 1978). 
4. Acceptance of new technology is strongly influenced by social processes 
involving the development of “shared” knowledge, opinions, beliefs and social 
norms on the part of consumers (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971).  
Correspondingly, changing consumers’ perception of what is normative can 
strongly influence behavior related to energy efficiency. 
5. People weigh the value of information received from their peers more heavily 
than they do others in evaluating new technology (Darley and Beniger 1981) – 
thus, information diffusing through a social network is much more likely to be 
perceived and acted on than broad spectrum media campaigns.  Therefore, social 
marketing techniques involving infusing information into social networks 
through social opinion leaders and others should impact behavior related to 
energy use. 
6. People act to reduce cognitive dissonance when they receive information that is 
inconsistent with their current behavior either by rejecting the information or 
changing their behavior (Festinger 1957; Kantola et al. 1984).  Therefore, 
messages can be designed that are more likely to induce behavior change related 
to energy efficiency decision-making once customers’ core values or strongly 
held beliefs are understood. 
7. The opinions and beliefs of the management of organizations strongly determine 
the receptiveness of the organization to the adoption of energy-efficient 
technologies and practices (Lutzenhiser et al. 2003).  Therefore, it should be 
possible to improve the likelihood that organizations make energy-efficient 
decisions by implementing programs designed to influence the actions of the 
leadership. 
8. The opinions and beliefs of the management of organizations are formed and 
maintained in social networks that have connections inside and outside their 
organizations (Chattopadhyay et al. 1999). 
                                                
1 Consumers often apply different decision-making rules that do not appear to correspond well with 
maximizing benefits or minimizing risks.  For example, consumers sometimes choose alternatives that 
improve the condition of others at their own expense (altruism) or alternatives that express their similarity 
to others in society (conformity).  For a detailed discussion of these decision making heuristics, see 
Sullivan (2009). 
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The above partial list of interesting insights from behavioral and economic sciences 
suggests that lots of interesting possibilities for altering consumer behavior related to 
energy use, such as: 
1. Discovering effective advertising and marketing strategies that cause consumers 
to invoke other frames of reference (other than cost benefit analysis) in making 
decisions involving the purchase of energy-efficient technology alternatives and 
lifestyles.  
2. Identifying program targeting strategies that enhance the likelihood that 
contacted parties in the mass market act on the information they receive. 
3. Developing effective community and interest group level interventions that use 
mechanisms in the social environment (i.e., social networks, laws, norms, and 
social influence hierarchies) to cause consumers to make more efficient choices.  
4. Finding more effective means of fostering energy efficiency improvements by 
educating customers through alternative information channels (e.g., social 
networks, community groups, schools, etc.).  
5. Measuring and documenting the effects of programs designed to foster energy 
efficiency by providing feedback to consumers regarding the costs, benefits and 
consequences of their behavior (i.e., using modern technology to assist 
consumers in identifying appropriate behavioral changes).  
6. Measuring and documenting the effects of programs designed to achieve energy 
efficiency improvements by causing persistent changes in attitudes, opinions, 
norms and values of consumers. 
7. Developing effective means for causing the management of enterprises to 
establish formal energy efficiency improvement goals, appoint a trusted team 
member to achieve them, and provide funding to support the efforts of the people 
in the organization to identify and implement energy efficiency improvements.    
All of the above ideas make sense and are supported by reasonable empirical evidence 
that suggests that they may be very useful in increasing the likelihood that consumers will 
adopt energy efficiency technologies and practices.  Unfortunately, at the present, most of 
these ideas are, at best, reasonable hypotheses.  The problem is that little systematic effort 
has been made to move these ideas from the theoretical stage to the operational stage.  
They are good theories, but today that is really all they are.   It may well be that actions 
implied by these theories can strongly impact the adoption of energy-efficient 
technologies and behavior, but we simply aren’t sure how to do it.    
The objective of this paper is to describe R&D strategies and experimental designs that 
are appropriate for discovering ways of changing specific, well-defined behaviors related 
to the use of energy in buildings (both residential and commercial) and production 
processes.  In particular, the paper suggests R&D strategies and procedures for 
developing or modifying energy efficiency programs offered by utilities, so that they 
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increase the likelihood that consumers will purchase energy-efficient devices and change 
their energy use behavior.2  This paper argues that innovation is needed in the 
development and modification of energy efficiency programs focused very explicitly on 
increasing the likelihood that consumers adopt the technologies that these programs offer.  
The essence of innovation in new product and service development is experimentation.  It 
is at the core of all successful efforts to develop and present new products and services to 
the market (Thompke 2003).  
A fundamental barrier to innovation in the development of energy efficiency programs 
offered by utilities is that there isn’t an institutional framework within which program 
improvements can be operationally tested and implemented.  Given the foci of the 
government agencies (e.g., the California Energy Commission (CEC) and the California 
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)) and other institutional players (e.g., utilities and 
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)), there currently aren’t any institutional 
mechanisms for systematically improving our knowledge of how to alter consumer 
behavior related to the adoption of energy-efficient technologies in meaningful ways.  
Proposing that utilities suddenly start using innovation management techniques as 
described in this paper to improve the design of energy efficiency programs will not 
change the situation.  It won’t change the situation because the regulatory environment in 
which the utilities are operating is not currently designed to support this activity.  To 
change the situation, the existing regulatory environment has to be modified.  In closing, 
this paper suggests changes to the regulatory environment of utilities that would 
encourage, indeed require, innovation in the development and implementation of energy 
efficiency programs. 
Before we undertake this discussion, we briefly describe how experimentation is typically 
used by industry to develop and market new products to consumers.  Along the way, we 
discuss different types of market experiments and the applicability of these techniques to 
the development of energy efficiency programs.   
2.  Managing Innovation 
Innovation happens when new and revolutionary ideas are translated into new products 
and services. The product is only part of the innovation.  Innovation requires the 
penetration of the product into the market.  It is a revolutionary process whereby an old 
way of doing things is replaced by a new one.  Innovation doesn’t usually happen by 
                                                
2 To be sure, there are other interesting consumer choices and behaviors that may have an even greater 
impact on societal energy use for which means could be found to alter them.  However, the sponsors of this 
paper have an abiding interest in changing consumer behavior related to the choice of energy using 
equipment in buildings and business process, so the work in this paper is focused on that aspect of the 
problem.  It is probably worth considering how other behaviors might be altered and how institutional 
mechanisms could be altered to foster R&D that would accomplish such research, but that work is for 
another day. 
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chance.  It happens through a painstaking process of experimentation in which a better 
way of doing things is found by trial and error.   
Perhaps the greatest innovator of all time was Thomas A. Edison. His laboratories 
developed the first practical electric light bulb, the 110 volt AC motor, phonograph and 
movie projector.  In all, he was responsible for more than 1,000 patents.  Prospero, as he 
has been called, measured the productivity of his laboratory not by the number of 
inventions it made or by their economic worth.3  He measured the productivity of his 
laboratory by the number of experiments it completed in a day.   
Experimentation is at the very core of innovation.  It is how humans learn what works 
and, more importantly, learn what doesn’t work.  It is the principal means by which all 
progress is made.  The value of experimentation is not confined to the development of 
things like light bulbs, computers and automobiles.  It applies to the development of 
innovative techniques for doing all kinds of activities – activities like surgery, 
accounting, law, finance, marketing and sales.  It also applies to the development of 
innovative techniques for improving the likelihood that consumers buy energy-efficient 
products and changing the behavior of humans and organizations related to their use of 
energy.   
Since the early 1980s, when industry in the US began to lose its dominance in world 
markets for manufactured consumer goods, a substantial amount of attention has been 
paid in the academic literature to studying the management of innovation.  There are a 
few seminal ideas from that literature that should be applied to thinking about the 
management of innovation in developing more effective energy efficiency programs.  
The most important idea in the literature on the management of innovation is that 
innovation can be managed and that it must proceed through a well-understood process 
that all parties involved in agree on. 
                                                
3 Prospero was the protagonist in Shakespeare’s The Tempest who became the wizard of light.  Edison was 
given this nickname by his friends and biographers. 
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2.1. Innovation Must Be Managed 
The first and most important idea from the management of innovation literature is that 
innovation should proceed through an orderly process in stages – from idea generation to 
full scale implementation.  The basic idea is that the R&D process should take maximum 
advantage of information available as early as possible to avoid making mistakes later in 
the process which are likely to be costly as the development process proceeds.  
Organizations that manage innovation typically establish formal procedures and review 
processes through which new product and service ideas must pass on the way to market.  
The design of innovation management systems varies from organization to organization, 
but they generally involve a stepwise process in which development moves from 
relatively inexpensive and quickly executable steps in product development to more 
expensive steps that entail much greater risk and commitment to proceed.  The following 
is an example of an idealized product or service development process: 
1. Concept development – in this stage, the proposed product or service is 
developed to the point that it can be described to management and potential 
consumers.  The effort in this phase is focused on making the basic idea as 
concrete as possible in terms of how it actually will work, who will buy it, 
what they will do with it, how large the market is for it, what will be required 
to deliver it, and how much it will cost.  At the end of this stage, the decision 
is made whether to take the product or service to the next stage.  
2. Concept testing – in this stage, the concept is presented to customers to get 
their reactions to the idea and their recommendations for how it can be 
improved.  Concept testing can be performed using a wide variety of 
techniques such as focus groups, in-home interviews and product clinics.  The 
type of test determines the methods used.  At this stage, the product concept 
may be significantly modified in response to customer reactions, or the 
product development effort may be stopped altogether based on what 
customers say about it. 
3. Business case – at this stage, a business case is developed for the product or 
service which takes account of the information contained in the concept 
development and testing phases.  The business case is usually presented to a 
review committee that has responsibility for evaluating proposals for new 
products or services and makes the determination as to whether the proposed 
business meets the criteria (risks, development costs, hurdle rates, etc.) 
necessary for proceeding to the next and much more expensive steps in the 
development process.   
4. Product development – in this stage, the work required to actually make 
prototype versions of the product or service is carried out, and the 
performance of the prototype is “bench tested” to make sure it does what it is 
intended to do.  This stage is probably the longest and most expensive activity 
in the development process.  It is the point at which all of the technical and 
institutional hurdles to the development of the product must be overcome.  It 
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is the stage when the first working version of the product is found and its 
efficacy is demonstrated for the first time.  This stage often involves a great 
deal of experimentation to overcome design issues that are inherent in new 
products or services. 
5. Market testing – once the prototype product or service has been fully 
developed, an effort is made to test the receptiveness of the market to the 
product through the distribution channels and advertising that are being 
considered for the launch. Techniques for market testing range widely.  In the 
automobile industry, for example, potential new car buyers are exposed to 
prototype models and asked to compare them with alternatives - present 
models and those provided by competitors (these clinics can cost as much as 
$1 million per project).  In packaged goods, products are often placed in a 
panel of stores along with facings, displays and point-of-purchase promotions 
like those that are being considered for use in launching the product.  The 
performance of the product in these “mini markets” is then evaluated in 
relation to that of competitors and adjustments are made as necessary.  The 
purpose of market testing is to evaluate the performance of the product under 
conditions as similar as possible to those in the market.  The results of this 
evaluation are then used to adjust the product and marketing collateral for the 
launch.  Products can make it all the way to this stage and be scrubbed, but it 
is not common. 
6. Production – at this stage, the process needed to support production and 
delivery of the product is ramped up, and the product is launched. 
This orderly process or something like it takes place continuously in nearly all companies 
that are involved in developing new products and services.  Very large firms like Toyota, 
General Motors, Boeing, Genentech, Microsoft, Proctor and Gamble, Eli Lilly and Bank 
of America have numerous new products under development at any point in time, all at 
different stages in the development process.   For many companies, this effort is vital to 
their survival as competition is steep and products have a limited lifespan in the context 
of the actions of competitors.  Products are normally brought to market as quickly as 
possible, but not before they are ready.  Nothing fails quite as spectacularly as a product 
that is brought to market before it is ready. 
Even small companies that are starting up products in competitive industries generally 
use a version of this process, because the discipline of the market forces them to do so.  
Venture capitalists inject capital into firms that can show that they are moving their 
product through an orderly development process of the kind described above.  Firms that 
cannot demonstrate progress along the above described lines are sometimes not funded; 
and if they are funded, they are subjected to rigorous timetables designed to move them 
through the above-described process. 
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2.2. Organizing for Innovation 
Organizations that must innovate to survive in competitive markets (e.g., automobiles, 
consumer electronics, pharmaceuticals, software, medical devices, etc.) establish R&D 
departments that have primary responsibility for developing products and services 
through the first three stages of product development (i.e., from concept development to 
prototype development). During the later stages of the process, the other departments that 
have responsibility for production and marketing are involved. 
The above process can be implemented in an organization using a variety of 
organizational structures.  In some companies, the process is implemented within major 
product lines by establishing R&D departments within them.  In other organizations, a 
central R&D department is established to serve the whole enterprise.  Regardless of how 
it is organized, the process is implemented by establishing an R&D function that employs 
a systematic process to screen ideas for new products, select promising candidates based 
on their fit with the goals of the business, support their development, and integrate 
developed products back into the normal operating environment of the business. 
A good example of how a major services firm used innovation management techniques to 
improve its business services was provided by Stephan Thomke (Thomke 2003).  Prior to 
the 1990s, the Bank of America spent very little time and resources on R&D related to 
the development of its products and services.  There was no formal process for 
developing new products and services, and, consequently, ideas for new products tended 
to go straight from the minds of their originators to test markets – with frequently 
disappointing and sometimes dangerous results.  However, in the early 1990s, as a result 
of a variety of converging events, the company established a formal product and service 
development team, known as the Innovation and Development (I&D) Team.  This team 
developed a formal process for developing and testing new products and services and 
implemented a “test bed” comprised of 24 bank branches located in their Atlanta market.  
The test bed was used to carefully experiment with a wide variety of changes to its 
customer service delivery systems.  The objective of the test bed was to provide locations 
where small-scale experiments could be carried out rapidly to determine their impacts on 
customer behavior and satisfaction.  Using this approach, the bank was able to conduct 
small-scale experiments on customers to discover what they liked and disliked about new 
products and services.  This made it possible to inexpensively vet new ideas and perfect 
operations before large numbers of customers were exposed to them.   They have 
developed and tested a number of branch improvements on the test bed.  Because there 
are 24 branches in the test bed, it provides a powerful capability for conducting carefully 
controlled experiments on changes in all kinds of banking services on customer 
satisfaction and other key indicators of customers’ perception of service quality. 
2.3. Principles of Effective Innovation Management 
Another important idea from the literature on the management of innovation is that 
certain basic principles should guide the development of new products and services (and, 
by way of inference, energy efficiency programs).  These principles are as follows: 
  9 
i. Someone must be assigned responsibility for knowing everything about 
the project – someone has to be responsible for knowing how the whole 
product development exercise fits together and what the status is of 
everything at any point in time.  This person is the project champion who 
is responsible for representing the project to management oversight 
committees and boards and keeping the various parts of the product 
development process moving.  
ii. Maximum utility should be obtained from information early on in the 
development process – when important problems are found late in the 
development of a product or service, the results can be devastating.  Little 
problems that can be easily solved in the beginning of the product 
development process can become gigantic problems during later 
development stages.  The best examples of these kinds of problems are 
what are called integration problems.  These are situations in which two 
parts of a product (being designed by different parties) are occupying the 
same space (i.e., the parts don’t fit) in the design.  If these problems are 
resolved early on in the development of a product or service, they can be 
resolved inexpensively.  If they are found later, they may present very 
serious delays, re-engineering challenges and dramatic cost overruns. 
iii. Experiment frequently – experiments are expensive, but late stage failures 
and rework are more expensive. It is better to experiment with small-scale 
models of designs early and often then to wait until the end of the design 
and development process to perform a big test on the whole system.  It is 
better for two reasons.  First, the big test may not reveal which of the 
components of the system is contributing to failure; and second, small-
scale tests early on may reveal problems which, if resolved at the early 
stage, are much less expensive to resolve.   
iv. Experiment rapidly – the purpose of experimentation is to obtain relatively 
immediate and useful feedback.  Experiments that take too long to 
complete may impede progress toward a solution to the problem rather 
than enhance it.  Ideally, experiments should be completed within 90 days 
of commencement.  There will, of course, be circumstances when the time 
required to complete an experimental cycle considerably exceeds 90 days. 
The effects of some drugs on laboratory models may take years to 
observe.  In these situations, multiple simultaneous experiments are 
recommended.  Grand-scale experiments requiring months or years to 
complete should be reserved for really significant (i.e., high risk, high 
benefit) long-term problems.   
v. Fail early and often but avoid mistakes – failures in experimentation are to 
be expected and provide valuable information about the way the world 
works.  Mistakes that happen when experiments are not properly 
controlled or designed provide little or no information about how the 
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world works and are to be avoided.  At best, mistakes are wasteful.  At 
worst, they can lead to the development of inferior products. 
Taken together, the above principles define a highly controlled program development 
environment in which mostly small-scale experiments with program elements are 
performed early on in the development process in order to minimize the risk of big 
program failures.  These design principles are well-suited as guidelines to developing 
R&D projects designed to discover effective behavioral science-based approaches to 
improving the likelihood that consumers adopt more energy-efficient technologies and 
practices. 
2.4. Implications for Developing Energy Efficiency Programs 
Most of the existing energy efficiency programs being operated by California utilities 
were not developed using an innovation management process of the kind outlined in the 
preceding sections.  This conclusion is supported by several observations: 
1. Most energy efficiency programs were developed by energy utilities, and the 
responsibility for R&D concerning energy efficiency does not reside with the 
utilities. It is assigned to the Public Interest Energy Research (PIER) group at 
the CEC.  PIER is primarily engaged in technology development and 
demonstration.  There do not appear to be any projects within the PIER 
structure designed to improve existing energy efficiency program delivery 
systems.  
2. There are no reports to the regulators by utilities concerning the results of 
R&D efforts being undertaken in conjunction with the development or 
improvement of energy efficiency programs. 
3. Until very recently, there has been no specific discussion of R&D activities 
related to improving program performance on the part of utilities.  
Improvements in program performance are expected to be derived from 
information obtained from process evaluations – research that is conducted in 
the course of full-scale program operations – not in the course of program 
development.    
4. Thus far, CPUC has not authorized or earmarked payments to utilities to 
engage in R&D to support energy efficiency program development beyond 
technology demonstration projects and pilots of new program ideas.   
This is not to say that programs were developed haphazardly.  Their development has 
followed a path.  However, it is a path that usually involves taking a shortcut around an 
important stage in the process of innovation (i.e., experimentation with alternative 
product design elements during the product (program) development stage).  It is a path 
that runs directly from the concept testing stage to the test marketing stage (i.e., pilot 
test), or beyond, to implementation of the full scale program.   
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This shortcut probably brings potential energy efficiency programs to market sooner than 
would a process involving carefully designed small-scale experiments intended to test 
alternative program design features prior to test marketing.  It also probably dramatically 
increases the risk that energy efficiency programs moving from the concept testing stage 
to the operational stage will be ineffective and difficult to terminate.4   In such situations, 
the programs themselves may become experiments – very large and expensive 
experiments that produce information of questionable value very slowly. 
One might imagine that market tests or pilot programs themselves serve the same 
purposes in the development of energy efficiency programs as the Program Development, 
Test Marketing and Production phases taken together.  There are several reasons why this 
is not a good way to think about the role of market tests.  First, market tests are the last 
stop on the way to program development.  They are not meant to test the efficacy of 
different program design alternatives.  They are meant to test the eventual performance of 
the fully developed prototype prior to full-scale production.  Clearly, it is possible to 
determine from a market test whether a given program prototype can achieve its 
objectives at a given time and place.   However, the information obtained from a market 
test generally is not very useful for making detailed product or program design changes 
unless a number of market tests are carried out while varying program design features.  In 
which case, the market tests are experiments.  Depending on the size and duration of the 
market test, this can be a very expensive approach to testing design alternatives. 
To understand the difference between the kinds of experiments that are being advocated 
in this paper and the kinds of pilots or demonstrations that typically take place in energy 
efficiency program development, it is useful to consider an example of a program design 
problem and how it might be approached through experimentation on the one hand and 
pilot testing or full-scale rollout on the other.  The example actually concerns the 
development of a demand response program, but the lessons to be learned about the 
usefulness of experimentation are the same for both kinds of programs. 
 
Experimentation Example:  Demand Response Program Development  
A major west coast utility currently has more than 300,000 residential customer 
participants signed up for a load control program that allows them to cycle or shed 
customer air-conditioning load during emergencies.  Incentive payments on the program 
vary with the size of the air conditioner, the degree of cycling (50%, 67%, and 100%) and 
the frequency with which cycling can occur (a maximum of 15 times or unlimited).  For a 
3-ton air conditioner, payments can range from as little as $18 per summer to as high as 
                                                
4 Once programs are placed within the organizational context, they often develop institutional supporters 
who may be reluctant to terminate an otherwise unsuccessful effort.  Examples of institutional supporters 
include: program managers, evaluators, senior management, regulators and interveners.  These parties may 
instead encourage incremental changes over funding cycles to try to improve performance instead of 
recommending that ineffective programs be killed outright. 
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$130 per summer.  The vast majority (89%) of program participants has selected the 
100% cycling strategy, and 75% of all customers have elected to allow the utility to cycle 
their air conditioners an unlimited number of times in a given summer.  In other words, 
they have selected the combination of cycling severity and frequency that produces the 
maximum possible discount for participation.   
The program has been used infrequently and primarily for localized distribution problems 
rather than across the full participant base.  Consequently, few customers have ever been 
cycled.  To improve the economic performance of the program, it could be converted 
from the current, capacity-based, incentive-driven reliability resource to a performance-
based (i.e., customers are paid when they curtail) resource and dispatched more 
frequently based on economic rather than emergency criteria.  However, moving from a 
capacity-based dispatch model to an economic dispatch model while retaining existing 
customers poses significant program redesign challenges.  Significant attrition from the 
existing program can be expected to occur under almost any circumstances, but some 
combinations of program features and marketing strategies are likely to be more effective 
in retaining customers than others.    
It is possible to imagine several potentially viable approaches to transitioning from the 
current reliability-based incentive design to a design based on performance, such as the 
following: 
1. Existing participants could be offered the choice of continuing on the current 
program at substantially reduced incentive levels (in line with their true economic 
value) or signing up for a new program that would compensate them 
(substantially more) on a per curtailment basis commensurate with the value of 
the energy avoided during high cost periods.   
2. Existing participants might be offered the choice between continuing on their 
current program at substantially reduced incentive levels or signing up for a 
combination of Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) and/or Time of Use (TOU) rates.   
3. Existing participants might be offered choices within a menu of program 
operational levels (e.g., frequency, notice, duration, etc.) with varying incentive 
levels – similar to the way the program works currently but with incentives for 
reliability-based curtailment reduced significantly to its current worth and most of 
the customer benefit transferred to performance.   
4. Existing customers might be assigned to one of the first two performance-based 
program designs and would be allowed to opt out to a much reduced capacity-
based plan.   
There are other important program design issues, but the above options are sufficient to 
identify significant program design alternatives that should be tested during the process 
of redesigning the program.    
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It is not obvious which of the program design and marketing strategies in the demand 
response program example will yield the best results (high retention and high value load 
relief).  Indeed, the choice among the foregoing options can really only be made after 
observing how consumers respond to them.    
Confronted with the above set of alternative designs, the program designer has two basic 
choices. They can carry out focus groups and customer surveys with samples of 
customers asking them about their preferences (which needs to be done in any case) and 
then select an approach that seems most effective – going directly to the CPUC for 
approval either of a full-scale transition or for a large-scale pilot.  Alternatively, they can 
experimentally offer these program design alternatives to small representative samples 
(300-400) of customers and observe their reaction.  Based on the results from these 
experiments, the designer can select one of the alternatives, or they might test again based 
on the results obtained in the first set of experiments.   
The alternative that allows for testing of the various program approaches obviously 
produces much more concrete information about how consumers would respond to 
different combinations of program design alternatives.  It could be conducted very 
quickly --- if not within 90 days, within 120 days.  Moreover, this approach significantly 
reduces the economic risk to the utility and society involved in the decision (i.e., stranded 
capital and damaged emergency demand response program capacity).  Given the 
unknowns and the resulting substantial economic consequences, using experimentation to 
perfect the transition design is certainly cost-justified and almost certainly the right 
approach in this situation.   
Unfortunately, three probably fatal barriers stand in the way of the simple, small-scale 
experiment as described.  First, it almost certainly will be necessary to gain regulatory 
approval for offering the different experimental alternatives to customers. This may slow 
the process of program development down considerably and may lead to a complete stop 
based on the reaction of regulatory staff.   Second, there will be resistance by operating 
departments in the utility to proliferating non-standard billing arrangements (for the 
customers assigned to different experimental groups).  Finally, there is usually some 
“institutional resistance” to making dramatic changes to program operations that tends to 
cause key parties in the design process to favor small incremental changes over dramatic 
ones.  People have staked their professional reputations on the outcome of the program, 
and these considerations sometimes cloud judgment when it comes time to make 
significant program changes.  Taken together, these practical considerations are 
significant barriers to a very rational approach to program development.  This is the sort 
of situation that typically causes the jump from the concept testing stage (i.e., focus 
groups and market surveying) to full-scale program implementation in the current 
program development environment – that, and the ever-present need to act quickly. 
With the exception of some notable market failures (e.g., New Coke and mortgage-
backed securities), very few products take the risk of shortcutting the innovation process 
by going from the concept testing stage to test marketing or beyond.  Correspondingly, 
there is little reason to believe this is a reasonable approach to developing effective 
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energy efficiency and demand response programs.  Nevertheless, it happens almost 
constantly with energy efficiency program development. 
It is, of course, reasonable to ask: would an organized product innovation process of the 
kind conventionally used by industry to develop products and services really improve the 
effectiveness of energy efficiency programs in increasing the likelihood that consumers 
would adopt more energy efficient technology and practices?  The answer is: it might.   
Conceptually, the process of developing energy efficiency programs is the same as the 
process of developing any other kind of product or service.  Moreover, there is good 
reason to believe that the program development work that is short-circuited in the present 
process (program design and testing) is precisely the work that needs to be done to 
discover more effective approaches to improving the likelihood that consumers will adopt 
more efficient technologies and practices.  Finally, as indicated in Section 1, there are a 
number of potential adjustments that could be made to the existing generation of 
programs that could significantly improve the performance of existing program delivery 
systems.  So, there is ample reason to believe that innovation management could 
significantly improve the effectiveness of energy efficiency programs.  It remains only to 
be demonstrated. 
3.  The Elements of Experimentation 
This paper argues there is a significant opportunity to improve the effectiveness of energy 
efficiency programs by fostering innovation in program design – particularly, in taking 
advantage of knowledge from the behavioral sciences to develop more effective 
messages and message delivery mechanisms.  As explained above, experimentation is 
critical to successful innovation.  In this section, the kinds of experiments needed to 
foster innovation in energy efficiency program development are described.  This paper 
strongly advocates the use of scientific experiments as an integral part of the process of 
innovation in energy efficiency program design. This section dwells heavily on the logic 
underlying scientific experimentation while providing examples of experimental designs 
that are particularly useful in energy efficiency program development.  Those who are 
thoroughly familiar with these topics may wish to read only as far in this section as they 
find the subject matter interesting and useful; and then move on to the conclusions and 
recommendations section where improvements to the existing program management and 
regulatory framework are discussed.  
At the outset, it is important to distinguish clearly between ad hoc demonstration projects 
and pilot programs on the one hand and scientific experiments on the other.  It isn’t that 
ad hoc demonstrations and pilots are inappropriate to support some aspects of program 
development.  It is that they are not usually designed as experiments and, as such, not 
useful for sorting through possible program design alternatives to conclusively determine 
what really works and what doesn’t; and this is a critical requirement for fostering 
innovation in the development of program alternatives in the future. 
So far, the use of experiments in program development has been discussed without 
carefully considering what experiments are and what they are not.  Humans use 
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experiments all the time to solve problems in their daily lives.  If we turn on the light 
switch in our homes and the light doesn’t come on (and other appliance in the home are 
working), we change out the bulb and turn the light switch on again to see if that solves 
the problem.  If that doesn’t work, we go to the circuit breaker or fuse panel and reset the 
breaker or fuse.  If the light still doesn’t come on, we may try another bulb or maybe 
change out the light switch.  If that doesn’t work, we probably call the electrician.  In an 
important sense, these are all experiments.  They have in common the fact that we are 
varying some condition of the world to see if the situation changes.   
Some of the experiments that are performed in product innovation are as simple as the 
one outlined above.  This is particularly true when the development of a prototype 
involves the application of physical processes such as temperature, chemistry, force, etc.  
However, experiments designed to alter human behavior usually are not so simple.  
Human behavior, while highly predictable under some circumstances, is inherently more 
unpredictable than the behavior of physical materials, and this complicates the design of 
experiments involving humans.   
This complication necessitates the use of “statistical experimentation.”  What 
distinguishes statistical experiments from the simple experiments done in daily life is that 
statistical experiments are designed to more or less definitively determine whether a 
given antecedent condition or set of such conditions causes some characteristic of a 
population of interest to change and by how much.  It turns out that this is really not a 
very easy thing to do.  In fact, there is a very large amount of academic literature 
governing the design of scientific experiments involving humans. 
The discussion in this paper is meant only to introduce the reader sufficiently to the key 
issues in the design of experiments, so that the utility of such designs in identifying 
effective improvements in energy efficiency programs can be demonstrated.  Readers 
interested in knowing more about the designs discussed in this paper should read 
Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference 
(Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002).  This book is an excellent and very readable 
introduction to the topic. 
In the 19th Century, John Stuart Mill proposed a set of conditions that must be met in 
order to show that some condition in the world causes some other condition in the world 
to change: 
1. The supposed cause has to precede the supposed effect in time; 
2. The supposed cause must be correlated with the effect – that is, when the cause is 
present the effect is present, and when it is not, the effect is not present; and 
3. No other plausible explanations can be found for the effect other than the cause. 
These basic conditions provide the underlying logical basis for the design of scientific 
experiments.   
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Moving from the abstract world of philosophy to the world of empirical science, it is 
extremely rare to find any variable that is caused by a single other variable.  Most 
empirical effects are caused by multiple conditions, and it takes a particular combination 
of these causal factors to bring about an hypothesized effect.  We know, for example, that 
forest fires can start in a variety of ways – a carelessly discarded cigarette, a spark from a 
machine, a lightning strike or a smoldering campfire can all start a forest fire. For any of 
these to actually cause a forest fire, a number of other conditions need to be present.  The 
forest needs to be sufficiently dry, the temperature needs to be high enough, the wind 
needs to be blowing from the right direction, etc.  In practice, we usually don’t know how 
all the potential causal factors interrelate with one another to actually bring about a given 
effect when we are trying to isolate the effects one of them.  So, it is with changing the 
behavior of humans.  Consequently, cause is something most scientists think about 
probabilistically rather than deterministically.  That is, cause is spoken of as something 
that changes the probability that something will happen. 
Before discussing experimental designs that will be useful in discovering effective 
improvements to energy efficiency programs, it is necessary to spend a few paragraphs 
describing the overall logical framework that underlies most experimental designs.  The 
fundamental purpose of scientific experiments is to create conditions under which it is 
possible to correctly infer that changing some condition in the world will cause a 
difference in the way the world operates.  There are certain very important logical 
requirements that must be met in order to correctly conclude that something has actually 
caused some other thing.  The two most important logical requirements are that the 
experiment be internally valid and that it be externally valid. 
3.1. Threats to Internal Validity 
A number of things can happen during an experiment that can cause an experimenter to 
incorrectly conclude that changing a given condition or set of conditions has changed the 
probability that some outcome has occurred.  In a simple comparison of the outcome of 
interest before and after exposure to an experimental variable (sometimes called a pre-
test/post-test design), there are a number of possible alternative explanations for 
differences that might be observed besides the operation of the so-called causal variable.  
The following important possibilities are: 
1. History – when we observe a difference in the world at two points in time, it is 
quite possible that some other factor may have changed in addition to the 
experimental variable and that this other variable is principally responsible for the 
observed effect.  
2. Maturation – when we observe a difference in the world at two points in time, 
whether we are observing animate or inanimate objects, it is possible that the 
object in question matures (i.e., gets older) and something about the aging process 
causes the change in the outcome measure of interest.   
3. Testing – when we observe a difference in the world at two points in time, it is 
possible that the measurement procedures we are using actually are altering the 
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situation.  Again, looking from one time to another, it may be that our 
measurements taken in the first time period caused a change observed in the 
second time interval.  This happens all the time in tests with humans when they 
are tested multiple times using the same procedures.  
4. Instrumentation – when we observe a difference in the world at two points in 
time, it is possible that the calibration of the instrumentation used to measure the 
outcome of interest changes between the two points in time during which the 
experiment takes place. Thus, the changes in the outcome measure of interest are 
due to changes in instrumentation, not to an experimental variable.   
5. Statistical regression – when we observe a difference in the world at two points in 
time, depending on how observations were selected for testing, it may be the case 
that measurements taken in a second time period are different and closer to the 
statistical mean of the overall population.  This difference can cause us to believe 
that an effect occurred as a result of the treatment or it can cause the effect to be 
masked. 
6. Mortality – mortality is like maturation except the observed effect of the 
experimental condition arises from the fact that some subset of a group of 
observations being taken is not observable at the second time period for reasons 
unrelated to the experimental condition.   
The above problems can be eliminated by comparing what happens to two different 
groups (as opposed to looking at the same group at two different points in time).  The 
drawback with this approach is that the groups may not have been exactly the same to 
begin with.  This is called: 
7. Selection – the groups for which the comparison is being made (experimental vs. 
control) may have been different before the measurement was taken.  So, in this 
case, there is no basis to infer that the treatment was responsible for all of the 
differences observed after exposure to the treatment. 
All of the above are what has been described as threats to internal validity.  That is, they 
are plausible alternative explanations for why one might observe a difference at two 
points in time (before and after exposure to an experimental condition) for a given group; 
or a difference between two groups exposed to different experimental conditions 
observed at the same point in time.  Establishing experimental procedures that ensure 
internal validity is a critical requirement in experimentation.  Experiments that are not 
internally valid are generally not very useful because they are inconclusive. 
3.2. Threats to External Validity 
The external validity of an experiment refers to whether or not the results obtained in an 
experiment can be generalized from the circumstances of the experiment to a broader set 
of circumstances.  That is, whether or not the causal relationships found in the experiment 
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apply when the persons, settings, treatments or outcomes are changed from the exact 
conditions observed in the experiment.  
1. If the persons or objects observed in an experiment are significantly different 
from those for which the generalization is to be made, there is reason to suspect 
that the causal relationship observed in the experiment may not hold. 
2. Likewise, it is possible that the experimental treatment works differently in 
different settings, so that if the setting to which the generalization is to be made is 
very different from the setting in which the experiment was conducted, there is a 
possibility that the causal relationship will not hold. 
3. If the treatment or outcome measures are changed significantly, there is reason to 
doubt whether the causal relationship observed during the experiment will hold. 
It is possible to overcome the first and second threats (differences in persons and settings) 
by selecting random samples from the relevant populations of interest (e.g., persons and 
settings) and assigning them randomly into the experimental conditions. 
Controlling the third threat to external validity poses a significant challenge in applied 
research – particularly, applied research involving outcomes that are to be produced by 
large organizations.  It is possible to create a reasonable small-scale simulation of a 
marketing process and conduct it with randomly chosen customers to observe the impacts 
of the process on the likelihood they will adopt the choice that they are given.  However, 
scaling up the experimental prototype to the larger marketing organization can result in 
changes that cause the actual program operations to be different from what was 
accomplished in the experiment.  As much as possible, to preserve external validity, it is 
necessary for the actual program to be as similar to the actual treatment as possible.  This 
argues for carrying out field experiments that are as similar as possible to the conditions 
that will be used in an actual program.  On the other hand, integration of R&D into 
normal business operations is often very difficult to do and can greatly increase the cost 
and time involved in carrying out an experiment.  The loss of experimental control that 
results may also degrade internal validity.  Given these considerations, it is necessary to 
carefully balance the risks arising from both design alternatives.  In the end, it is probably 
preferable to isolate the organization itself from the experimental process during R&D.  
Then, if the program doesn’t work for some reason, it is possible to isolate the sources of 
problems in the delivery mechanism.   
Most of the literature and thinking concerning experimental design that has evolved over 
the past 100 years has focused on techniques for ensuring the internal validity of 
experiments – that is, ensuring that the causal mechanisms that are being described are 
actually producing the results obtained in the experiment.  The discussion of the design of 
experiments begins with a description of what is generally thought of as the Classic 
experimental design – the randomized experiment.  
  19 
3.3. Classic Experimental Design 
In the discussions that follow, it is useful to talk in concrete terms about how the various 
experimental designs can be used to answer important questions about the efficacy of 
energy efficiency program modifications.  Ideally, this section would provide examples 
of actual experiments conducted in the context of energy efficiency program 
development to illustrate how experiments are used and useful in the process of program 
development.  Unfortunately, there is very little evidence of the use of experimentation in 
the development of energy efficiency programs and services in the recent history of the 
development of these programs in California.5   Instead, examples will be given of how 
experimental designs can be used to develop one of the promising new techniques under 
development at present for improving the performance of mass-marketed energy 
efficiency programs – statistical targeting. 
3.3.1. Developing Effective Statistical Targeting – an Example 
For the past several years, statistical targeting algorithms have been under development 
by a number of parties for improving the likelihood that consumers will respond when 
contacted.  These approaches are in their infancy and there is much to learn about their 
effectiveness and to improve upon them going forward.  For simplicity’s sake, this paper 
will concentrate on the application of experimentation to improving targeting techniques.  
This thread of innovation is simple to understand and easily lends itself to 
                                                
5 Techniques from experimental design are sometimes used to evaluate the magnitude of energy savings 
that were obtained by energy efficiency programs. Pre-test post test designs (a kind of quasi-experiment) 
are often used to calculate the difference between energy use before and after the installation of equipment 
to estimate program impacts.  Statistical comparison groups (non-equivalent control groups) are 
recommended in the California Evaluation Framework (CEF) whenever possible as an improvement over 
the common one group pre-test post-test design (TechMarket Works 2004).   However, these commonly 
accepted quasi-experimental techniques used to assess the performance of energy efficiency programs are 
not really experiments in the sense that they are meant in this paper.  Their purpose is not to discover 
whether a program design element causes significant improvement or degradation.  It is to verify savings.  
Hence, these studies are more like audits than experiments.   There are also references in the CEF to the use 
of true experimental designs as a means to improve estimates of energy savings – particularly as regards to 
the problem of understanding the impacts of free-ridership.  However, it does not appear that any of the 
evaluations conducted to date have employed these techniques (TechMarket Works 2004).  In the literature 
on the impacts of pricing on consumption, there are good examples of experiments designed to measure the 
responses of consumers to demand response initiatives (e.g., dynamic pricing and load management).  The 
best example of this work is the Statewide Pricing Pilot (Charles River Associates 2005; George et al. 
2006).  Nevertheless, and most importantly, no recent examples were found of experiments designed to test 
the various alternatives to the design of energy efficiency program delivery mechanisms, such as message 
content, advertising, targeting, channel effects, social network affects, or other actions that might improve 
the likelihood that consumers adopt the target technologies and behaviors.  While significant efforts are 
under way to find and demonstrate the efficacy of new energy-efficient technologies (e.g., higher efficiency 
lighting), there has been almost no systematic effort to find and demonstrate more effective means of 
causing consumers to adopt new and more energy-efficient technologies – at least no effort using the 
techniques commonly used in product development in business and industry.   
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experimentation.  It should be obvious that the conclusions that are being reached 
regarding the benefits of experiments for understanding the effects of targeting 
algorithms apply to efforts to incorporate other behavioral science techniques and 
theories into energy efficiency program improvements. 
The idea behind statistical targeting is simple.  Depending on the marketing channels, 
contact protocols and messages being used, energy efficiency program implementers 
sometimes churn through thousands of customer contacts to find a relatively small 
percentage (2-5%) of customers that adopt the energy efficiency actions that are being 
sold.  The basic idea behind statistical targeting methodologies is that information 
obtainable from the utility and in the public domain (about customers) can be used to 
identify customers whose propensity for adopting an energy efficiency alternative is 
higher than that of the average customer.  By focusing on these high value targets, the 
cost-effectiveness of marketing can be improved, and the market penetration of desired 
energy efficiency alternatives can be increased more quickly. 
In theory, targeting could dramatically improve the efficiency of program offerings.  
However, algorithms for scoring customers for their propensity to respond to energy 
efficiency programs are in their infancy, although there are multiple technical approaches 
being offered in the market.    
The potential efficacy of improved targeting is more than a theoretical possibility.  In a 
recently reported demonstration of a commercially available targeting algorithm, 
developers reported that statistical targeting resulted in a five-fold improvement in the 
likelihood of energy efficiency measure adoption (Willis 2009).   Such a large increase in 
the response rate could dramatically improve the efficiency of marketing.  Unfortunately, 
the reported improvement is based on a demonstration, not on an experiment.  What is 
the difference?  The demonstration consisted of comparing the rate of acceptance of an 
energy efficiency alternative marketed in two different years by the same implementation 
contractor.  In the first year, the customers in the implementation contractor’s cold call 
list were not selected using the targeting algorithm; in the second year, they were selected 
on the basis of this algorithm.  On the surface, this seems like a fairly robust test.  
However, it fails to control for most of the significant threats to internal validity 
discussed above.  It is possible that targeting improved the response rate.  It is also 
possible that something else happened between the first and second year that caused the 
improvement in response (history), or that the implementation contractor who knew 
about the test intensified their efforts or made other changes to their procedure that 
changed the response.  Indeed, virtually all of the threats to internal validity are plausible 
alternative explanations for the dramatic improvement in response.  In essence, it is 
impossible to conclusively say whether targeting produced the improvement in response, 
or whether it was produced by some other factor arising from the way the demonstration 
was done.  The point here is not that the demonstration results are wrong or misleading.  
It is that they are, at best, inconclusive.  To obtain conclusive evidence of the benefits of 
targeting, a true experiment must be conducted. But what is a true experiment? And how 
is it different from a demonstration?   
  21 
3.3.2. Completely Randomized Design 
The problems with the demonstration described above are not unusual.  They have 
plagued scientific investigations from the very beginning.  Around the turn of the last 
century, Sir Ronald Fisher proposed a simple experimental design that solved these 
problems by controlling for virtually all of the threats to internal validity.  While it is 
often impossible to employ this design in practical applications, it is useful to understand 
how it works, because it is the basis for virtually all classical experimental designs.  
The most elementary experimental design is called a Completely Randomized Design.  It 
is possible to visualize this design as a four-fold table as indicated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Block Diagram of Completely Randomized Experimental Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this design, observations are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups.  The 
treatment group is exposed to the experimental factor.  The control group, which is 
statistically identical to the treatment group, isn’t exposed to the experimental factor.  
Random assignment effectively eliminates the possibility of selection effects; that is, the 
possibility that the groups were somehow different at the outset of the experiment.  The 
use of the control group eliminates all of the other possible alternative explanations for an 
observed difference between the groups because the control group experiences the same 
history as the treatment group, matures at the same rate, is exposed to the same 
measurement protocols, and experiences the same mortality.  Both the treatment and 
control groups of observations are measured on the outcome variable of interest before 
and after the experimental factor is introduced.  Observations in this simple experimental 
design can be anything that can be subjected to observation (e.g., pea patches, people, 
buildings, businesses, etc.).   
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The effect of the experimental variable is measured as the difference between 
differences.6   That is: 
Effect = (Tpost – Tpre) – (Cpost-Cpre) 
This very simple design provides an unambiguous measurement of the effect of the 
experimental variable on the outcome variable of interest that can be readily subjected to 
statistical tests for purposes of determining whether the observed difference could have 
occurred by chance alone given the sizes of the samples involved.  It rests on the 
assumption that the experimenter has complete control over the composition of the 
experimental and control groups and the presentation of the treatment variable.  For 
reasons that will be discussed below, this situation is difficult to achieve in applied 
research settings.   
It is possible to imagine a simple, yet powerful experimental test of the efficacy of a 
given targeting algorithm using a completely randomized design.  This test involves first 
randomly selecting a group of 1,000 customers from the total population of customers 
who are eligible for the program offer.  Next, customers are randomly assigned into the 
control and treatment conditions.  The customers in the treatment group are scored 
according to the targeting algorithm, and they are contacted in declining order of the a 
priori estimated propensity to participate (from the targeting algorithm).   The control 
group is contacted in random order.  Exactly the same marketing should be undertaken 
for both groups except for the order in which they are contacted.  The organization 
carrying out the customer contact should not be aware of the test. 
The effect of the scoring algorithm can be observed by comparing the average value of 
the order variable (i.e., where the target respondent appears in the call list) for the 
treatment and control conditions.  If there is no effect of the targeting algorithm, there 
will be no difference in the average order values for successful marketing contacts in the 
two groups.  On the other hand, if the propensity score is highly correlated with 
likelihood of acceptance of the offer, the average order value for customers who accept 
the offer in the treatment group should be significantly lower than it is for the control 
                                                
6 In practice, it is often impossible to obtain pre-treatment measurements for a variety of practical reasons.  
An experiment designed to assess the impact of a given targeting algorithm on program response rates is 
such a case.  The outcome variable of interest is the change in the likelihood that prospective energy 
efficiency program participants adopt the technology or practice that is being sold based on some sort of 
propensity score.  There is really no way to observe the likelihood that a given participant will take the 
subject offer without offering it to them. So, it is impossible to obtain pre-treatment measurement on either 
the treatment group or the control group.  However, the absence of a pre-treatment measurement is not 
really a problem provided the sample sizes in the experiment are large enough so that the standard error of 
the outcome measurement is small enough to detect the size of difference that is considered meaningful 
from a practical standpoint.  This is so because random sampling guarantees that the expected values of the 
outcome measure (i.e., the likelihood or average) are equal for the treatment and control conditions to 
within plus or minus a known statistical error rate. 
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group – because the high propensity customers are concentrated at the beginning of the 
treatment list.  Further, using log linear modeling techniques it will be possible to 
estimate how much impact the propensity score variable has on the actual likelihood of 
participation – thereby making it possible to quantify the potential magnitude of the 
efficiency improvement.  Unlike the demonstration cited in the example of targeting, the 
results of this experiment are capable of being logically conclusive.  The treatment and 
control groups are statistically identical to each other, so any difference in the order 
variable has to be the result of targeting.  Of course, if the difference is not large or the 
treatment and control group sample sizes are too small, the results may be statistically 
inconclusive. 
The usefulness of the Classical Experimental design in practical applications is limited by 
the fact that many interesting empirical effects (e.g., change in the likelihood that 
consumers adopt energy efficient technology) arise from the operation of multiple causal 
factors and while the process of randomization ensures these factors do not systematically 
affect the experimental outcome, they are capable of producing substantial noise or 
random variation in the outcome variable of interest.  This can cause the operation of the 
causal variable of interest to be muted by or masked altogether in the outcome of an 
experiment.  This problem has led researchers to elaborate on the randomized design in 
several ways.  They are discussed below. 
3.3.3. Randomized Blocks Design 
As discussed above, there is bound to be a certain amount of noise in the measurement of 
the effect of an experimental variable.  For example, it is possible that a targeting 
algorithm is effective under some circumstances but not others.  It might work for small, 
stand-alone, owner-occupied grocery stores but not for chain stores or big box retailers. 
Or it may work for some kinds of energy efficiency program offers, but not others.   
There are all kinds of possible confounding factors.  This is an example of experimental 
noise.   
It is possible to control for experimental noise by carrying out the randomized design for 
blocks of customers stratified according to the variable that is suspected of producing it.  
This is called a randomized blocks design, and it basically involves repeating the 
completely randomized experiment for customers within the different blocks or strata. 
Figure 2 displays a Block Diagram of this experimental design.  It is nothing more than a 
series of four-fold tables like the one in Figure 1 – one for each of the blocks or strata.  
The benefit of this design is that it is possible to detect the effect of the treatment variable 
within the blocks and between them – so it is possible to describe what is called the main 
effect of the treatment variable within the blocks as well as the effect of the blocking 
variable to the extent that is of interest.  This approach to experimentation is analogous to 
stratified random sampling in surveying. 
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Figure 2: Block Diagram of Randomized Blocks Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main effect of the experimental variable is measured as the weighted (by the number 
of observations) average of the experimental effects observed in each of the strata. 
Let’s return to the targeting example to see how a Randomized Blocks Design could be 
useful in measuring the improvement in program performance that arises from statistical 
targeting.  The basic idea behind targeting is that the advance knowledge of important 
customer characteristics can improve the likelihood of contacting customers that will act 
on an energy efficiency program offer.  In a perfect world, the targeting algorithm would 
be designed to take account of all of the customer characteristics that could be known 
about in advance of making an offer that could influence the outcome of an offer. In this 
perfect world, there should be little to be gained from blocking – because the scoring 
algorithm should take account of all the differences in customer characteristics that 
should be controlled to reduce noise in the experiment.  This is an important point to keep 
in mind about blocking.  It conveys no benefit and even can degrade the statistical 
reliability of an experiment if the blocking factor has no effect on the dependent variable. 
Of course, the real world is far from perfect, and there may be a number of customer 
characteristics that influence the likelihood of participation that simply aren’t included in 
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the targeting algorithm, either because the algorithm is too simplistic or because advance 
information about these factors is not available.  For the moment, however, let’s assume 
that the targeting algorithm takes account of virtually all of the customer characteristics 
that might influence the outcome.  Is there no need for blocking? 
Actually, even in the situation where the targeting algorithm takes account of all the 
customer characteristics that might influence the decision to adopt an energy efficiency 
measure, there are still important controllable sources of variation that may mask the 
effect of the targeting algorithm in a completely randomized experiment.  One that 
immediately comes to mind that can strongly affect the likelihood consumers accept a 
sales offer is the unique effect of the sales person/team.   Sales persons/teams sometimes 
vary tremendously in their effectiveness and productivity as a result of differences in 
experience, training and motivation.  This is essentially a random variable that could 
strongly influence the outcome of a sales offer.  In any test of the effectiveness of 
marketing, this variable is a very good candidate for control, both from the point of view 
of isolating noise and from the point of view of gauging the eventual effectiveness of the 
targeting algorithm.  
The effects of this variable are relatively easy to control in a Randomized Blocks Design.   
In such an experiment, the sales person/team becomes a block.  If there are two sales 
persons/teams, there are two blocks.  If there are four sales persons/teams there are four 
blocks, and so on.  Each block is given a randomly chosen set of treatment (ordered by 
targeting score) and control cases.  In essence, the completely randomized experiment is 
repeated for each block.  Depending on the number of blocks involved in the experiment, 
it may be necessary to increase the overall sample sizes to obtain minimal statistical 
precision in all the cells. 
The benefits of blocking in this manner are two-fold.  First, blocking on this variable will 
remove a potentially large source of random variation from the measurement of the 
impact of the targeting algorithm, thus allowing for a more precise estimate of the unique 
effect of the targeting algorithm.  Second, it will allow for meaningful quantification of 
the variation in the effectiveness of targeting controlling for the impact of the marketing 
team – an important source of uncertainty about the likely future effects of targeting in 
another year or at another location. 
3.3.4. Factorial Designs 
Not all experimental variables that one might wish to manipulate are binary (present or 
not).  Some experimental variables have levels that are hypothesized to produce different 
effects on the dependent variable.  One example of an independent variable that 
immediately comes to mind for experiments related to energy efficiency is the incentive 
level associated with the offering.  The impact of incentives on consumer behavior is 
complicated.  In some cases, if incentives are not large enough, no behavior change will 
occur.  However, it has also been shown in some cases that once a certain threshold 
incentive level is reached additional incentives do not improve the likelihood of the 
behavior of interest.  So, it is not just the presence or absence of incentives that is likely 
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to produce a behavioral change, but the magnitude of the incentive.  These kinds of 
experimental effects can be measured in what are called factorial experiments. 
In a factorial experiment, an experimental variable that can take on different levels is 
called a factor.  The factor is presented in the experiment at different levels, and the 
objective is to measure the change in the experimental outcome caused by the change in 
the level of the factor.   
So far, discussion has centered on experiments designed to detect the effects of a single 
targeting algorithm – either present or absent.  To see how factorial designs might be 
useful in assessing the impacts of targeting, it is necessary to consider a situation where 
there is more than one level of the targeting algorithm.  Instead of a single algorithm, 
imagine a situation where there are two possible targeting algorithms.  One algorithm is 
the information that is readily obtainable by the utility from its own records and can be 
easily updated internally at low cost (e.g., utility bill records, prior adoption of utility 
sponsored energy efficiency improvement, SIC code, etc.).  In addition to this simple and 
inexpensive approach, there is another targeting algorithm offered by a commercial 
vendor that is driven both by the information available to the utility and the proprietary 
information that the utility must purchase on a subscriber basis (e.g., years in business at 
location, ownership status, number of employees, revenues, etc.).  The question is: how 
much does the higher cost targeting algorithm improve the likelihood that consumers 
adopt the offered energy efficiency product or service?  A factorial experiment would be 
useful in this situation for observing the effects of the different levels of targeting. 
The two different targeting algorithms represent different levels – one simple and 
relatively inexpensive and the other more complex and relatively expensive – of a single 
factor (targeting).  In a factorial experiment, observations are randomly assigned to 
differing levels of the experimental factor as well as to treatment and control conditions.  
In this case, the factor has two levels – call them low and high cost.  For this experiment, 
a representative sample of 2,000 customers would be drawn from the eligible customer 
population.  Half of this sample would be randomly assigned to the low cost experimental 
level and half would be assigned to the high cost experimental level.  Then, the groups 
within each level would be randomly divided again into treatment and control 
conditions.7  As in the case of the completely randomized experiment, the treatment 
group in Level 1 would be sorted and processed in declining order of the propensity score 
from the low cost targeting algorithm.  The control group in Level 1 would be processed 
in random order.  The treatment group in Level 2 would be sorted and processed in 
declining order of the propensity score for the more expensive algorithm.  The control 
group for Level 2 would be processed in random order.  The effects of targeting would be 
measured as described in the discussion of the completely randomized experiment. 
                                                
7 It is often possible to suppress repeated control groups and develop an aggregate control group to obtain 
economic efficiencies.  In this case, there is a single control group that provides a standard against which 
both levels of the factor are observed.   
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It is also possible to study the effects of more than one factor at a time in a factorial 
experiment. Figure 3 shows a block diagram of such an experiment 
Figure 3: Block Diagram of Factorial Experiment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is a straightforward extension of the simple factorial experiment, except instead of 
one factor, there are more than one.  For example, another factor that might have an 
effect on a consumer’s decision to adopt an energy efficient technology is the magnitude 
of the incentives that are being offered in the program.  Another possible factor is the 
marketing strategy that is being used to contact the customers.  It might be, for example, 
that a contact protocol involving a pre-contact letter from the utility explaining that they 
will be soon be contacted concerning their interest in participating in an important energy 
efficiency improvement program significantly enhances the likelihood they will listen to 
the coming cold call eliciting participation.  Using a factorial design, it is possible to 
structure an experiment that is capable of measuring the combined effect of these two 
variables on consumers’ decisions.   
The combined effects of two experimental variables can occur in three ways.  First, it is 
sometimes the case that the combination of two factors has a multiplicative effect on a 
dependent variable.  That is, the effect of one of the factors magnifies the effect of the 
other.  This is called an interaction effect.  Interactions indicate that the variables working 
in tandem produce significantly stronger or weaker effects than would be expected if only 
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one of them was present.  In trying to improve on the effectiveness of energy efficiency 
program delivery systems, this is precisely the sort of relationship that one should be 
looking for – something that increases the leverage of the aspects of the program that are 
already in existence. 
If the variables do not interact, it is possible to observe two other kinds of effects called 
the main effects of the factors of interest.  Main effects are essentially the unique effects 
of one of the (in this case) two factors in the experiment.  In this case, it would be the 
effects of the incentives alone or the effects of the information treatment alone on the 
dependent variable.   
While it is possible to imagine testing more than two factors in a single experiment, care 
has to be taken in the design process to ensure that the interactions of the variables are 
interpretable.  Interactions involving more than two variables are difficult to interpret, 
and the whole point of doing a factorial experiment is to find interactions that are 
understandable. 
It is possible to form a large variety of hybrids experimental designs using combinations 
of the foregoing basic ideas.  Readers interested in a further discussion of classical 
experimental designs should consult Experimental Designs: Second Edition (Cochran and 
Cox 1976). 
3.3.5. Covariance Designs 
The Randomized Blocks design described above can control for a small number 
uncontrolled factors (e.g., sales person/team) that can influence the outcome variable of 
interest.  However, the effectiveness of this design depends critically on having advance 
knowledge that the experimental affect varies significantly within values of the blocking 
variable(s).  Blocking on a variable for which this not the true will not reduce the noise in 
the experiment and will generally lead to lower statistical power. 
An alternative approach to blocking that does not depend as much on prior information 
about the effectiveness of the blocking factor and which allows for a larger number of 
control variables is called the Covariance Design.  In the Covariance Design, the 
experiment is conducted in exactly the same manner as the randomized experiment.  
However, in addition to the outcome variable of interest (in this case, the likelihood of 
responding to the marketing contact), measurements are taken on all of the variables that 
are thought to influence the likelihood of participation (“covariates”).  Examples of 
possible covariates for the current example could include:  
• Sales person/team 
• Number of contact attempts 
• Customer business type 
• Number of employees 
• Ownership type 
• Building type 
• Usage 
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• Demand 
• Likelihood that the business would adopt the energy efficiency measure before 
the test (if known) 
• Education of the decision maker 
• Impact of the decision on the customers’ bills 
• Prior history of adopting energy efficiency measures 
• Attitudes and opinions of the management about the impact of energy use on 
climate change 
The variation in the composition of the groups under study with respect to all of the 
uncontrolled but potentially powerful independent variables will produce noise in the 
measurement of the effect of the outcome variable.  This noise can be greatly diminished 
by controlling for the correlations among the dependent and uncontrolled independent 
variables analytically (i.e., after the fact of the experimental manipulation).   
In a covariance design, the values of the uncontrolled independent variables are observed 
(usually) before the experimental treatment has occurred for both treatment and control 
groups.  It is possible, therefore, to estimate a regression function that predicts the mean 
of the outcome variable of interest from the uncontrolled independent variables for both 
the treatment and control groups.8  These regression adjusted means or proportions are 
then used to estimate the values of the outcome variable of interest in the treatment and 
control conditions.  That is, instead of comparing simple means or proportions for 
treatment and control groups, we are comparing regression adjusted means or proportions 
for these groups.   
Figure 4 displays a hypothetical example of a covariance design in which the outcome of 
an experiment (in treatment and control groups) is analyzed by comparing regression 
adjusted means.  To the extent that the variables in the regression functions more or less 
precisely predict the values of the dependent variable, they will produce much more 
statistically precise estimates of the dependent variable than the sample means or overall 
proportions observed in the treatment and control groups without adjustment.  Of course, 
if the predictive power of the regression models is low, the improvement in statistical 
precision will not be significant.  In studying consumer behavior related to energy use, 
covariance designs are extremely useful.   
 
                                                
8 In practice, it is not necessary to calculate a separate regression equation for treatment and control groups.  
Instead a single regression equation containing a unique intercept parameter for subjects in the 
experimental condition and control conditions is usually used.  It is necessary in carrying out an analysis of 
covariance to verify that the values of the uncontrolled independent variables did not somehow interact 
with the experimental treatment.  This should not have occurred because the subjects were randomly 
assigned to the treatment and control conditions.  However, in studies where random assignment was not 
part of the experimental design, discovery of such interactions is required. 
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Figure 4:  Example Analysis of Covariance Adjusted Means 
 
Figure 4 displays a scatter plot of the results of the experiment.  The variable on the y 
axis is the outcome or dependent variable.  The variable on the x axis is the covariate.  In 
the figure, it is evident that the dependent variable generally increases with the value of 
the covariate.  However, there is a difference in the effect of the covariate for the 
treatment (represented by blue circles and blue regression line) and the control condition 
(represented by the red crosses and red regression line).  Inspecting the graph carefully, it 
is apparent that while the swarm of points is relatively wide, it is generally the case that 
the blue circles are above the red crosses.  The regression lines are parallel (i.e., they have 
the same slope) indicating the effect of the covariate is the same in both treatment and 
control conditions.  However, the intercepts are different – the intercept of the blue line 
being above the intercept for the red line.  This is the effect of the experimental variable. 
The result depicted in Figure 4 is but one of many kinds of effects that might arise in an 
analysis of covariance.  For example, it is possible that the regression lines are not 
parallel, but instead cross at some point.  This is a circumstance where the effect of the 
covariates varies with the treatment condition.  It is what is called an interaction between 
the treatment condition and the covariate.  When this occurs, it is impossible to interpret 
the main effect of the treatment independent of the effect of the covariate because the 
difference between the slopes changes as the covariate changes.  While such a finding 
makes the interpretation of the relationship between the covariate and the treatment more 
difficult, it is no less informative than a simple main effect. 
The example in Figure 4 contained only a single covariate.  However, the analysis of 
covariance as described above can be applied to situations in which many covariates are 
included in the regression equation.   In such a situation, particular attention has to be 
paid to ensuring that covariates do not interact with the treatment, but there are 
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conventional and widely accepted regression modeling procedures to find and evaluate 
such interactions. 
3.4. Quasi-Experimental Designs 
All of the Classical experimental designs described above have in common the fact that 
observations (e.g., subjects, households, businesses, etc.) are randomly assigned to 
treatment and control conditions.  For many experiments that will be required to assess 
hypotheses concerning the impacts of different program design options on the likelihood 
that consumers adopt more energy efficient technology, it will be possible to randomly 
assign observations to experimental conditions and use the Classical designs.  This 
approach is definitely to be preferred when it can be applied.   
However, occasions frequently arise when random assignment to experimental conditions 
is impossible.  There are at least two important classes of R&D problems that fall into 
this category.   
1. It is impossible to use random assignment when exposure to the treatment condition 
of interest is compulsory, or when observations have the ability to select whether or 
not they are subjected to the experimental condition.  There are well known examples 
of this situation in medical science.  For example, in studies related to the efficacy of 
medical treatments, it is unethical to withhold treatment from parties who could 
benefit from it.  So, it is often impossible to randomly assign patients to experimental 
conditions in experiments concerning the efficacy of medical treatments.   
These issues also sometimes arise in studies of energy consumers served by utilities.  
For example, the purpose of the California Statewide Pricing Pilot (Charles River 
Associates, 2005; George and Farouqui 2006) was to determine the extent to which 
consumers would reduce their energy demand and usage in response to time 
differentiated pricing including a critical peak pricing (CPP) signal.9  While 
researchers argued strongly that random samples of customers should be assigned to 
the treatment and control conditions in this experiment, the fact that publically funded 
programs must be made available to everyone led to the situation in which consumers 
were allowed to opt themselves in to the experimental condition.  The control group 
was then selected as a random sample of customers within classes, and differences 
arising from selection were controlled for analytically (insofar as it was possible to do 
so). 
                                                
9 The Statewide Pricing Pilot was an experiment in which representative samples of residential and small 
non-residential electric customers in California were assigned to different electric rate designs involving 
different types of time varying rates (e.g., time of use rates, rates that varied on a daily basis based on the 
cost of service, and current rates) as well as technologies used to assist customers in responding to pricing 
changes.  The critical peak pricing (CPP) design involves charging a significantly higher price for 
electricity during afternoon hours on a limited number of days when the cost of electricity production is at 
its highest level. 
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2. There is a second important class of experiments (and we use the term very loosely 
here) in which the experimenter has virtually no control over the assignment of 
observations to treatment and control groups.  A good example is one in which an 
effort is made to measure the impacts of energy efficiency programs undertaken by 
organizations or firms.  These experiments involve trying to observe the effects of 
programs offered in schools, or by local, regional or statewide governments.   
Problems of this kind are actually quite common in evaluating the effects of programs 
in education and public health.  In such studies, the organizations that received the 
treatment are matched on relevant characteristics with those that did not, and the 
differences between these “control” and treatment communities are attributed to the 
treatment condition.  
As discussed above, when random assignment to treatment conditions is impossible, the 
design of experiments is a much more complicated problem.  When observations are 
randomly assigned to treatment and control conditions, the plausible alternative 
explanations (e.g., history, maturation, etc.) for an observed experimental effect are 
logically and mathematically eliminated.  When this is not so, it is necessary to structure 
the experiment in such as way to observe whether these alternative explanations are 
plausible, measure their magnitude, and if possible, control for them analytically.  This is 
the domain of quasi-experiments. 
The design of quasi-experiments is something of an art, and a large number of such 
designs have been developed over the past four decades – too large to discuss 
comprehensively in this paper.  Readers interested in Quasi-Experimental designs that are 
particularly appropriate for guiding the development of energy efficiency programs 
should turn to Appendix A where several interesting applications are discussed. 
3.5. Closing Thoughts on the Use of Experiments to Foster Innovation 
This section has attempted to acquaint the reader with a general understanding of 
experimentation and how it can profitably be used to foster innovation in energy 
efficiency program development.  It is a complicated subject in some ways, and the 
reader might be wondering: does the problem really have to be this complicated, and does 
everything have to be subjected to experimentation? The answer is obviously not.  
Experiments are potentially expensive and time consuming.  So they should not be 
undertaken without considering the benefits that are to be gained and the probable costs 
in terms of resources and time.  The key to success in innovation lies not in slavishly 
applying experimentation to test all the possible improvements to programs that one can 
imagine.  It lies in strategically applying experimentation to obtain answers to critical 
questions about what works and what doesn’t – particularly when testing the impacts of 
new and potentially very promising techniques.   
4.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Innovation in the development of energy efficiency programs isn’t really an option, it is a 
requirement.  Ineffectiveness in energy efficiency program marketing is a serious and 
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largely unnecessary waste of societal resources that are being dedicated to addressing the 
most important challenge American society has encountered in generations.  Innovation 
depends heavily on the use of small-scale experiments designed to identify program 
designs that work and those that do not.  This paper has briefly outlined the basic 
elements of experimentation and presented examples of simple experimental designs that 
can be easily implemented in the context of program development to improve 
effectiveness.  The paper used a single, relatively simple example to illustrate how small-
scale experiments can be used to improve program performance.  In addition to targeting 
enhancements, there are many other possible program improvements that should be 
developed.  The effects of different messages, alternative delivery channels, alternative 
marketing contact protocols, social influence and a wide variety of other factors may be 
even greater than targeting improvements.  Without experimentation, we have no way of 
knowing. 
Experiments cost money, and they require time.  How can we be sure that the benefits 
arising from the use of experimentation exceed the costs in terms of money and time?  In 
theory, they should.  However, whether they do or not depends on how intelligently 
experimentation is applied to program development.   One thing is certain.  Proceeding 
along a path in which programs are modified by making small incremental changes from 
year to year is an inefficient, slow, expensive and largely ineffective approach to program 
improvement.  It is hard to see how using small-scale, carefully chosen experiments to 
guide program improvement could be worse than the status quo.  Like anything else, 
however, it remains to be demonstrated that the time and effort required to incorporate 
experimentation into program development is outweighed by the benefits captured in 
terms of increased program effectiveness – an interesting topic for an experiment. 
The need is there.  The tools are there.  The benefits appear to be potentially large.  So, 
what needs to be done to integrate commonly used innovation management practices 
including small-scale experimentation into energy efficiency program development.  It 
turns out that this objective is a very tall order.  There are several significant barriers to 
the adoption of the practices described in this paper, as described below. 
First, the regulatory process surrounding energy efficiency programs (i.e., the 
authorization process, funding cycle, evaluation, and oversight functions) in California 
discourages R&D by utilities designed to improve program performance in advance of 
full-scale program roll-out:   
1. Responsibility for energy efficiency R&D rests primarily with the CEC’s PIER 
organization, not with the utilities.  The PIER organization is principally focused 
on R&D related to new technology, not on program effectiveness. 
2. While, impact and process evaluation activities are relatively well-funded in 
California (i.e., about 8% of program cost) under the heading of Measurement and 
Evaluation, these activities are not primarily designed to provide information to 
improve program performance.  Instead, these activities are designed to verify 
whether the claimed savings (or actions taken by the implementers) were realized.  
The purpose of measurement and evaluation is not R&D.  The current focus of 
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measurement and evaluation is to audit the performance of the programs (i.e., 
determine whether agreed upon savings or activities have been delivered).  
Correspondingly, very little information that is useful for improving program 
performance is generated by this effort.  The information is generally too little 
(because no program design alternatives are tested in the full-scale roll-out) and 
too late (because it becomes available 2 to 3 years after the program has 
commenced operation). 
3. Except for relatively minor expenditures associated with concept development 
and testing, there are really no resources set aside in the utility program 
management and administrative budget for R&D designed to improve program 
performance.   
4. Energy efficiency programs are viewed as energy resources in a broad strategic 
sense within the regulatory paradigm.  Correspondingly, utilities agree to deliver 
cost-effective energy savings (as opposed to energy) in return for reimbursement 
for the cost of achieving those savings and financial incentives.  Periodically, 
regulatory bodies and the utilities negotiate energy efficiency savings targets, and 
the attainment of these targets drives the management of the energy efficiency 
programs within the utilities.  The ability of utilities to recover their costs and 
obtain incentives depends on achieving savings while minimizing program costs 
within a given funding cycle.  R&D costs that occur within a given funding cycle 
are applied to the program costs sustained in that cycle.  Given that utilities 
recover the cost of R&D through the cost of administration, significant R&D 
costs can erode both the ability of the utility to recover its costs and its ability to 
achieve desired incentives within a given funding cycle.  In essence, the current 
funding mechanism discourages investment in R&D that cannot be recovered 
within a given cycle.  This makes R&D a very unattractive alternative.   
Taken together, the above constraints discourage utilities from engaging in significant 
R&D designed to improve energy efficiency program performance.  Unless the 
constraints are resolved, it is unlikely that utilities will engage in meaningful R&D 
designed to improve the future performance of their programs.  These barriers can be 
overcome, but it will require an overhaul of the regulatory apparatus that provides 
funding for R&D that is not tied to near-term energy savings.  One way to accomplish 
this objective would be to build a Chinese wall around the R&D enterprise (within 
utilities) that encourages them to experiment with interesting program design alternatives 
and does not penalize them for the normal failures that attend experimentation during a 
given funding cycle.  That is, set aside funding for the R&D enterprise that can be used 
solely for that purpose and that is explicitly understood to be directed at improving the 
effectiveness of energy efficiency programs as soon as possible, but not necessarily 
within a given funding cycle.   
Now, this doesn’t mean that the utilities should be given a blank check to carry out 
whatever R&D that they imagine.  It means that utilities and regulators have to agree 
upon reasonable long-term R&D objectives related to the improvement of program 
performance and jointly prioritize the R&D agenda.  It also means that a regulatory 
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framework for routinely managing the attainment of those goals over time has to be 
developed.   
A second possible impediment to the implementation of significant R&D designed to 
improve energy efficiency program performance is the lack of experience on the part of 
both utilities and regulators in the management of innovation:   
1. As indicated in Section 2, R&D has to be integrated into business organizations in 
such a way as to foster innovation without disrupting normal business operations.  
There are lots of institutional models for how to do this (e.g., centralized R&D 
department, R&D spread across product lines, etc.).  However, it is not obvious 
what the best organizational structure would be for integrating R&D into a utility 
energy efficiency enterprise.  Since utilities have not been doing R&D of the kind 
discussed in this paper, it is very likely that their current organization for 
managing R&D is not ideal from the point of view of fostering innovation. 
2. A similar organizational challenge exists on the regulatory side.   If a significant 
R&D is undertaken by utilities to improve energy efficiency program 
performance, who within the regulatory staff will be responsible for overseeing 
this effort?  Will it be a department, a committee, a public board?  Who will staff 
these entities?  What should be their qualifications?  What should be their 
responsibilities?  Again, because so little R&D designed to improve performance 
has been undertaken to date, it is likely that the current organizational structure at 
the CPUC is not ideally suited to this task. 
One might imagine that once the regulatory barriers that are identified above are removed 
the organizational problems outlined above will resolve themselves organically.  That is, 
that the utilities and the regulatory body will naturally alter their organizational structures 
and labor forces to take account of the newly arrived R&D goals and funding.  That is 
probably wishful thinking that may result in a lot of unnecessary conflict between the two 
parties.  A better approach would be to instruct both bodies to study the staffing 
requirements needed to support a significant R&D effort and identify organizational 
changes necessary to competently implement the proposed R&D program, and to ensure 
that the funds are being expended prudently. 
It is obvious that the above recommended changes to the current operational paradigm for 
development of energy efficiency programs represent an extremely daunting challenge.  
It will require significant effort on the part of both the utilities and the regulatory staff to 
implement the suggested changes; it will be costly; and it will take time to get it right.   
On the other hand, it is extremely difficult to see how innovation in energy efficiency 
program development can be fostered without overcoming these difficult problems.   
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Attachment A – Discussion of Quasi-Experimental  
Designs 
 
A.1 Quasi-Experimental Designs 
A.1.1 Non-Equivalent Control Groups Designs 
As discussed in the main text, it is sometimes not possible to randomly assign 
experimental observations to treatment and control groups.  When this problem is 
accompanied by the absence of a pre-test, all of the major threats to internal validity are 
problematic.  In such situations, it is sometimes possible to create non-equivalent control 
groups whose behavior can be compared with that of the treatment group.10  These 
control groups are created by selecting their members from the same population (of 
people, cities, schools, etc.) from which the treatment group came based on their 
similarity to members in the treatment group.  The idea is to sample people or 
organizations from the same population that are as similar in important respects as 
possible to the people or organizations in the treatment group.  In essence, it is an effort 
to “manufacture” a control group that is as similar as possible to the control group that 
would have arisen from random sampling.  This is done by a process called matching. 
A number of different matching procedures have been developed including: 
1. Exact matching – where each observation in the treatment group is 
matched exactly with one member of the control group; 
2. Caliper matching – where each observation in the treatment group is 
matched within a range of one member of the control group; 
3. Bracketed matching – where each observation in the treatment group is 
matched with two observations in the control group – one above and one 
below the score of the treatment observation; 
4. Multivariate index matching – where each observation in the treatment 
group is matched exactly to one observation in the control group based on 
the value of an index comprising the weighted average of scores on a 
number of variables; and 
5. Propensity score matching – estimates of the probability of selection into 
the treatment group are used to match members of the population from 
which the control group is selected with members of the treatment group.  
This technique requires estimation of the probability of selection using a 
logit model containing as many known predictors of participation as can 
be imagined.  In simple terms, a logit model is a type of regression model 
designed to predict the probability that something happens (e.g., 
participation in a program) based on information about independent 
                                                
10 While non-equivalent control groups are sometimes used without a pre-test, this practice is to be avoided 
because it provides no basis for knowing whether the non-equivalent control group and treatment groups 
were the same prior to the experimental manipulation.   
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variables (e.g., education) that are correlated with the occurrence of the 
event in question. The control and treatment group members are then 
either exactly matched or stratified into blocks based on their propensity 
scores, and the results are analyzed in the manner in which Classical 
experimental designs are analyzed. 
Numerous variations on the above procedures have been invented, and their merits have 
been debated almost endlessly in the literature (Shadish et al. 2002).  Matching has a long 
and dubious history in the experimental design literature.  Over time, careful comparisons 
of the differences between measurements taken from non-equivalent control groups 
(created through matching) and groups created in randomized designs have revealed that 
matching comes closest to approximating the results obtained in randomized experiments 
when treatment and control group members are as similar as possible before matching, 
and are matched on variables that are statistically reliable and stable.  This is a tall order, 
but possible in some cases.  Among the alternative approaches to matching, the 
consensus is that matching based on propensity scores is the most effective way of 
matching.  Of course, this approach to matching is only possible when useful information 
is available concerning the variables that may have caused the members of the treatment 
group to have been selected.  To do this, you need detailed measurements of factors that 
may have caused the selection for parties who were selected into the treatment group and 
those that were not.  
A.1.2 Interrupted Time Series Designs 
A time series measurement consists of repeated measures of the dependent variable of 
interest before and after a treatment has been administered.  In energy efficiency and 
demand response studies, time series measurements are frequently available and 
extremely useful for evaluating the effects of experimental treatments involving time 
differentiated pricing (time of use (TOU) rates) and dynamic pricing (critical peak pricing 
(CPP) and real time pricing (RTP)).  The basic idea behind Interrupted Time Series 
designs is that if the onset time of the treatment is well known it should be possible to 
observe and quantify a perturbation in the time trend of the outcome variable after the 
onset of the treatment.  This design depends on several important considerations:   
1. The onset time of the treatment must be concretely established (i.e., it is 
definitely known that treatment commenced at a time certain); 
2. The effect of the treatment must be large enough to rise above the ambient noise 
level in the outcome measurement (time series data often contain cycles and 
random fluctuations that make it difficult to detect subtle effects of treatment 
variables); 
3. If the treatment is expected to gradually impact the outcome of interest, the time 
series before and after the treatment must be long enough to detect a change in 
the intercept or slope of the outcome variable after the treatment has occurred; 
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4. The number of observations in the series must be large enough to employ 
conventional corrections for autocorrelation if statistical analysis is required (as it 
almost always is)11. 
Interrupted time series designs are subject to several of the threats to internal validity 
that accompany experimental designs in general (see Section 3).  For example, the 
observation of a change in the intercept or slope in a time series may have been caused 
by something other than the experimental factor (History), or it might have been caused 
by a change in the measuring instrument accompanying the onset of the experimental 
factor.  To control for potential intervening explanations, a variety of quasi-experimental 
techniques can be employed including: the use of non-equivalent control groups as 
described above, adding non-equivalent dependent variables (i.e., other variables that are 
expected to be impacted by the same historical forces as the dependent variable but not 
the treatment factor); and manipulating the presentation of the treatment factor (adding 
and removing it) to observe the impact on the outcome variable.  The latter is only 
appropriate when the effect of the treatment factor is expected to be transient. 
As indicated above, the Interrupted Time Series design is extremely useful in analyzing 
the responses of customers to time varying prices and load management signals. It 
probably would also be very useful in analyzing the behavior of customers in response to 
almost any kind of feedback concerning their behavior related to energy use that can be 
observed either in their usage or demand levels.   
An example of how this technique is applied will illustrate its usefulness.  The responses 
of customers to dynamic pricing signals can be measured at 5 minute to one-hour 
intervals on a daily basis over the course of a season.  With the widespread penetration 
of advanced metering, this kind of data will soon be available for virtually all kinds of 
customers.  It is possible to send price changes to customers periodically over the course 
of time.  This is the basis of RTP and CPP.  It is possible to observe the impacts of 
changes in prices by observing the changes in customers’ loads that correspond with the 
price changes.  To the extent that customers modify their energy use in response to price 
signals, it is possible to observe this pattern in a time series over the course of the 
season.   
In the parlance of statistics, these designs are referred to as “within subjects repeated 
measures designs,” and they are the state of the art for observing changes in loads and 
usage in response to price changes.  Figure 4 displays the results of a within subjects 
analysis of the effects of CPP price changes on the loads and energy use of residential 
customers in the Statewide Pricing Pilot. 
                                                
11 Autocorrelation is the correlation between measurements of the same variable at different points in time.  
It is the case that the closer two measurements are to one another in time the more likely they are to be the 
same.  In time series analysis, it is important to correct for autocorrelation when values at a previous time 
period are used in a prediction model for a value at a later time period.  This is called a lagged dependent 
variable. 
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Figure A-1: Example of Application of Interrupted Time Series Design 
 
In Figure A-1 the average daily usage on treatment and control days is depicted.  That is, 
the impact of the treatment is inferred by measuring the difference within subjects in the 
experiment between their hourly electric usage on days when the CPP is in effect and on 
days when it is not.  The figure demonstrates the extent of load reduction that was 
obtained on the average in the experiment and allows estimation of the net energy 
savings or gain attributable to the operation of the program. 
A.1.3 Regression Discontinuity Designs 
It is sometimes the case that the assignment to experimental treatments is governed by 
strict quantitative criteria.   For example, the CPUC has mandated that all commercial 
customers with annual maximum demand in excess of 200 kW (who are not otherwise 
participating in a Demand Response program) are required to take service under an 
applicable CPP TOU rate starting in 2010.  They will have 45 days from the start of this 
requirement to opt out of the rate back into an applicable TOU rate.  A number of 
important questions surround the implementation of this policy, such as: 
1. What types of the customers will opt out of the CPP TOU rate option (this is 
observable once the policy is invoked)? 
2. Are structural benefiters (i.e., parties who will automatically benefit from such a 
rate) disproportionately likely to remain on the rate? 
3. How much change will occur in the loads and energy usage of both structural 
benefiters and others who remain on the rate? 
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A control group of customers that did not experience the change would be extremely 
useful in answering the above questions.  However, because everyone above 200 kW 
maximum annual demand will be required to make this change, a control group is not 
available. 
This is a perfect example of an occasion in which it is possible to employ what is called a 
Regression Discontinuity (RD) design.  In an RD design, observations are assigned to 
treatment control conditions exactly as a function of their score on an interval level 
quantitative indicator.   An interval level indicator is one in which numerical values 
represent equal intervals of value (e.g., Fahrenheit temperature, altitude, kW demand, 
kWh, etc.)   In an RD design, everyone above or below some point in the scale is 
assigned to the treatment.  So, in this case everyone above 200 kW is assigned to the CPP 
TOU rate, everyone below is not.   
It is possible to specify a regression equation describing the relationship between the 
assignment variable and the outcome of the experiment.  It might be that the outcome 
measure increases with the value of the assignment variable, decreases with it, or doesn’t 
vary at all.  It doesn’t matter.  What matters is whether there is a difference between the 
treatment and control groups at the point on the scale variable where the assignment took 
place. 
Figure A-2 displays two examples of the results of an RD analysis.  The top panel of the 
example shows the regression relationship between an assignment variable and treatment 
outcome when there is no treatment effect.  The assignment in this example takes place at 
the scale value 50.  Now, compare the regression relationship in the top panel with the 
one in the bottom panel.  Notice the discontinuity at the point on the assignment scale at 
which the assignment occurred.  The difference in the intercepts for the two regression 
lines depicted in the bottom panel is the effect of the treatment.   
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Figure A-2:  Examples of Treatment Effects in a Regression Discontinuity Design 
 
 
Figure 6 from Shadish, William R., Cook, Thomas D. & Campbell, Donald T., “Experimental and Quasi-Experimental 
Designs form Causal Inference,” 2002, pp. 210-211 
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This very simple idea is extremely powerful mathematically and statistically.  Among all 
the quasi-experimental designs, this is the only one that is completely equivalent to a 
Classical experimental design in terms of its internal validity.  That is, it controls all of 
the possible alternative explanations for the observed program effect.  There are certain 
important caveats that must be met:   
1. Assignment to the treatment must be strictly determined by the assignment 
variable.  Even the slightest deviation from this requirement will undermine its 
validity.   
2. Care must be taken to remove any crossovers from the analysis (i.e., sometimes 
parties will migrate into the treatment group from the control group and vice 
versa). 
3. Care must be taken to ensure that the functional form of the regression is correctly 
specified.  If the relationship in the regression is specified as linear and it is not, 
the regression discontinuity analysis may incorrectly interpret the point of 
inflection on the non-linear function as a discontinuity, and this will result in a 
serious error.  Likewise, if the treatment interacts with the assignment variable 
(causing a jackknifed shaped function), and the function is not properly specified 
as such, this will cause a serious error and one in which the error seriously 
understates the effect of the experimental treatment. 
In this section, only a few very relevant Quasi-Experimental designs have been discussed, 
and we have barely scratched the surface in terms of the possibilities.  The review should 
have been sufficiently broad to indicate that these designs are applicable to a very wide 
variety of R&D questions that will arise in the context of finding more effective means of 
improving the rate of adoption of energy-efficient technologies and practices.  The 
analytical tools are there.   
